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Abstract: The study examines the impact of bankruptcy threats on the likelihood of earnings 
manipulation in Nigerian listed banks. There is robust empirical evidence on the relationship between 
bankruptcy threat and earnings management in other countries while scanty evidence exists in Nigeria, 
hence this study was carried out in order to see if such results obtainable in other countries may hold in 
Nigeria. Using Altman Z-score and Beneish M-score, the expost-facto research design within a panel 
framework was employed and binary regression models were used in testing the hypothesis of the study 
via Eview 8.0. The study period is 2011-2015. The result reveals that bankruptcy threat has no 
significant impact on the likelihood of an upward earnings manipulation in Nigeria listed banks. The 
implication is that manipulation of earnings in Nigerian banks is spurred significantly by other factors 
outside the threat of bankruptcy. By this, regulators and bank managements are to place less emphasis 
on the bankruptcy position of banks when probing into issues of earnings manipulation because banks 
manipulate earnings not just because of the threat of bankruptcy, as non-potentially bankrupt firms also 
engage in upward earnings manipulation. Using the Altman Z-score and Beneish M-score, the study 
contributes to literature on the relationship between bankruptcy threat and earnings manipulation and 
submit that non-potentially bankrupt firms involve in upward earnings manipulation.  
Keywords: Altman Z-Score; Beneish M-Score; Upward Earnings Manipulation; Insolvency; Fraud 
JEL Classification: G33; G21; E50 
 
1. Introduction  
The prevalence of bankruptcy and corporate fraud is becoming alarming and 
earnings manipulation poses serious challenges to stakeholders in recent times. This 
has led to the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) assertion that 
financial statement fraud is an intentional misrepresentation of the financial 
information of an enterprise carried out through the intentional misstatement or a 
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material omission of amounts or disclosure in the financial statements to convey a 
false and misleading message to users of the financial statements. Determining the 
existence of fraud in organizations could be very cumbersome. The Beneish model 
uses financial ratios resulting into eight variables to identify chances that a company 
has manipulated its earnings in financial statements. The Beneish model as attested 
to by Warshavsky (2012) is similar to the Altman model only that it does not predict 
bankruptcy. It is a model that seeks to unearth financial statement fraud. Firms that 
return a high Beneish are potential manipulators of their financial statements. 
(Beneish, 1997; 1999; 2012)  
Could the threat of bankruptcy pressurize firms to resort to financial window 
dressing, bringing about misrepresentation of corporate financial information? 
Franceschetti and Koschtial (Undated) in an attempt to provide empirical evidence 
on the correlation between insolvency and fraud, conclude that no direct correlation 
exist between earnings manipulation and the threat of bankruptcy. Could financial 
distress provide motivation for earnings manipulation? Some empirical evidences 
have suggested that bankrupt companies manipulate results more than healthy firms. 
(Rosner, 2003; Garcia Lara, García Osma & Mora, 2005; Campa & Camacho-
Miñano, 2014) According to Deloite (2008), fraud and bankruptcy are seen to be 
bedfellows. Bankrupt companies, or firms close to it, are more likely to engage in 
corporate fraud including financial statement fraud. Specifically, bankrupt 
companies are 300% more likely than healthy companies to engage in earnings fraud. 
In the same vein, companies charged with fraud are more likely to file for 
bankruptcy. (Deloitte, 2008)  
To verify this assertion, Amoa-Gyarteng (2014) examines Anglogold ashanti, a 
listed firm in Ghana with a view to verifying early warning indicators of bankruptcy 
and its effect on financial statement manipulations. His findings provided no 
evidence of such relationship but posits that bankruptcy could not be clearly 
established just as there was no likelihood of earnings manipulation in the firm. 
Though his position was consistent with theory that potentially bankrupt firms 
manipulate earnings more than potentially non-bankrupt firms, there is need to 
examine various firms in a particular industry to ascertain whether evidences from 
developing nations are in tandem with other researches in developed economies. The 
fall of Enron, Worldcom and others have spurred researches on earnings 
manipulation and bankruptcy in developed countries. In years preceding bankruptcy, 
there are pressures and/or incentives for upwards earnings management to avoid 
bankruptcy by hiding poor performance.  
It is against this backdrop, in addition to the paucity of such researches in developing 
economies, especially in Nigeria, that this study is carried out. This informed the 
following research question: To what extent does bankruptcy threat impacts on the 
likelihood of an upward earnings manipulation in Nigerian listed banks? 
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Hypothesis of the Study 
H01:  Bankruptcy threat and has no significant impact on the likelihood of an 
upward earnings manipulation in Nigerian listed banks 
 
2. Review of Related Literature  
2.1. Earnings Management 
Over time, attempts have been made by various scholars in defining earnings 
management. Davidson, Stickney and Weil (1987) view it as “the process of taking 
deliberate steps within the constraints of generally accepted accounting principles to 
bring about a desired level of reported earnings”. For Schipper (1989), it is “a well-
conceived intervention in the external financial reporting process, with motives for 
private gain” or “occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to give stakeholders a misleading 
view of the economic position and performance of the company. For Healy and 
Wahlen (1999), earnings management is directed at influencing contractual 
outcomes that are based on reported accounting numbers.” The first definition 
emphasizes earnings management, consisting of manipulations involving accounting 
methods and classificatory choices. (Beattie, Brown, Ewers, Brian, Manson, Thomas 
& Turner, 1994) Commenting on the last two definitions, Dechow and Skinner 
(2000) opine that despite the wide acceptance, difficulties usually exist in the direct 
measurement centered on reported accounting numbers, since they are rooted in 
managerial intent, which is difficult to observe. 
Giroux (2003) asserts that earnings management involves the manipulation of 
earnings by the use of operating and discretionary accounting methods in arriving at 
a desired outcome. According to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(2000), earnings management “covers a wide range of legal and illegal management 
actions affecting the earnings and financial position of an entity. For Beneish, 
earnings manipulation occur when the management of a company contravenes the 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to present a favorable financial 
position and performance of the company”. (Beneish, 1999) Such manipulations 
could be prompted by the level of checks on the Chief Executives which determines 
management liberty on reporting. (Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney, 1996) 
In the words of Giroux (2003), earnings manipulation is an aggressive approach to 
earnings management involving “the utilizing of earnings management opportunities 
to misstate corporate performance in the interest of managers”. Nevertheless, fraud 
has a much broader meaning than the violation of GAAPs. In this study, fraud and 
earnings manipulation, as part of earnings management practices, are used 
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interchangeably to mean the same thing since both involve the intent to give a false 
position of things. 
2.2. Threat of Bankruptcy 
Financially distressed firms are usually linked with the problem of illiquidity 
requiring prompt intervention through the injection of funds so as to facilitate the 
process of resolving its financial challenges. The distressed firm as a matter of 
necessity needs cash sufficient to meet its obligations to employees, creditors, 
suppliers, and other stakeholders and also finance some projects having positive net 
present value. However, the ability to attract new funds is key to the future and 
survival of the ailing firm. For a distressed firm, there is usually difficulty in 
obtaining additional funding due to the fear usually nursed by lenders on the risk 
associated with lending to an ailing firm and the associated “debt overhang”. (Myers, 
1977) Potential lenders usually carry out an analyses of financial statement to be sure 
their resources are going into safe hands. As a way out of this quagmire, firms may 
resort to financial window dressing, bringing about manipulations and calling those 
things forth that be not, as though they were.  
2.3. Theoretical Foundation 
Beneish Model 
This study relies greatly on models in Beneish (1997, 1999) which provided the basis 
for estimating the likelihood of earnings manipulation. In order to detect earnings 
manipulators, Beneish selected some firms that are charged with or have admitted to 
manipulation, with the aim of developing a model that distinguishes them from non-
manipulators. This model derived from financial statement, comprises of eight ratios 
that capture either financial statement distortions that are aftermaths of earnings 
manipulation or that are indicators of susceptibility to earnings manipulation. The 
predictive ratios focusing on financial statement distortions capture outrageous 
accumulations in receivables, unecessary capitalization of expense and declines in 
depreciation and the extent to which reported accounting profits are at tandem with 
cash position (Accruals).  
These predictive ratios that are indicators of earnings manipulation, take cognizance 
of the deteriorating gross margins as well as the increasing administration costs. 
They also capture the increasing growth in sales associated with younger firms who 
have greater incentives to manipulate earnings so as to raise capital, and increase 
their use of debt (leverage), which are platforms favoring earnings manipulation. 
(Beneish & Nichols, 2007) 
The M-Score has a character of probability. A higher M-Score implies higher 
likelihood of manipulation. The model makes a comparison between current year 
and prior year. M-score models can be used as an early indication (red flags) for 
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detecting financial fraud. (Tarjo, 2015) Eight different ratios makes up the M-score 
and are stated as follows: 
Days’ Sales in Receivables Index (DSI) = A measure of the ratio of days’ sales in 
receivables in relation to the preceding year, and its used to indicate revenue 
inflation. 
Gross Margin Index (GI) = A measure of the changes in gross margin from prior 
year. Asset Quality Index (AI) = A measure of the ratio of non-current assets other 
than plant, property and equipment to total assets. It measures asset quality in relation 
to prior year. 
Sales Growth Index (SI) = A measure of the change in sales revenue from prior year. 
Although sales growth ordinary is not a measure of earnings, there are high 
likelihood that growth companies are under pressure to manipulate earnings so as to 
sustain the trend in sales growth. 
Depreciation Index (DI) = A measure of the changes in the rate of depreciation from 
prior year. 
Sales, General and Administrative expenses Index (SGI) = A measure of the ratio of 
Sales, General and administrative expenses to the preceding year. This is because, it 
is believed that financial analysts are likely to interpret a non-proportionate increase 
in turnover as a pointer to a poor future prospects. 
Leverage Index (LI) = A measure of total debt to total assets versus prior year. It 
capture the motivation debt covenants provide for earnings manipulation. 
Total Accruals to Total Assets (TAI) = A measure of managers’ ability to alter 
earnings using discretionary accounting choices. In computing Total accruals, 
depreciation is subtracted from the change in working capital other than cash. 
The eight measures are assigned weight and integrated in the formula below: 
M = -4.84 + 0.92*DSI + 0.528*GI + 0.404*AI + 0.892*SI + 0.115*DI – 0.172*SGI 
+ 4.679*TAI – 0.327*LI 
Altman Model: Multiple Discriminant Analysis 
In an attempt to assess the financial health and predict bankruptcy among firms, 
Altman (1968) initiated a multivariate Z-score. Over the years, it has gained much 
relevance as a diagnostic model for forecasting corporate distress. In the words of 
Altman (2000), Multiple Discriminant Analysis involve the use of statistical 
technique in classifying an observation into one or several apriori groupings which 
are dependent upon certain individual characteristics of the object being observed. It 
is of importance in predicting a phenomenon when the dependent variable is 
qualitative in nature e.g. healthy or unhealthy, bankrupt or non-bankrupt. The 
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analysis under multivariate method is transformed into one simplest dimension, the 
discriminating function of the firm.  
The Z-score has linear properties as it involve the objective weighing and summing 
up of five measures to arrive at a single value which becomes the criteria for 
classification of firms into various apriori groups (healthy and unhealthy). The Z 
score comprises of X1, X2, X3, X4 and X5 representing current assets/current 
liabilities, working capital/total assets, retained earning/total assets, earning before 
interest and tax/total assets, market value of equity/total liabilities and sales/total 
assets respectively. 
Working Capital to Total Asset Ratio: a measure of the net current assets (i.e. 
current assets less current liabilities) of a company in relation to its total Assets. 
Retained Earnings to Total Assets ratio: a measure of the cumulative profitability 
over time of a company. For an infant company, an adverse RA/TA ratio will emerge 
since it has no cumulative earnings overtime. 
Earnings before Interest and Tax to Total Assets ratio: a measure of the true 
productivity of the company’s assets.  
Market Value of Equity to Total Liabilities ratio reveals the extent to which a 
firm’s equity can reduce in value before the liabilities exceed the assets and the 
company becomes insolvent. Equity is a combination of market value of preference 
and common shares. 
Ratio Gross Earning to Total Assets: a measure of the firm’s assets utilization. It 
measures the ability of management in handling competitive conditions.  
The study measures the likelihood of bankruptcy in Nigeria listed banks using the 
Altman’s financial ratios. 
Below is the standard Z score model which has been proven effective over the years 
in different countries.  
Z= 1.2X1 + 1.4X2 + 3.3X3 + 0.6X4 + 0.999X5 
Where, 
X1= Working Capital to Total Assets. 
X2= Retained Earning to Total Assets. 
X3= Earnings Before Interest and Tax to Total Assets. 
X4= Market Value of Equity to Book Value of Total Liabilities. 
X5= Gross Earning to Total Assets. 
Z= Overall Index. 
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Altman advocated for the calculation of variables X1 to X4 as absolute percentage 
values e.g. the bank whose net current assets to current liabilities (X1) is 15% should 
be included as 15.0% and not 0.15. According to him, variable X5 should be 
expressed in a unit form that is a gross earnings to assets ratio of 300% should be 
stated as 3.0. The model provide categorization for the sampled firm (s) in three 
groups in terms of their calculated Z-score relation and financial performance. 
Table 1. Groups, Z-score Value and Interpretations 
Groups Z-score value Interpretation 
I Below 1.80 Poor Performance and high threat of Bankruptcy  
II 1.80 – 3.00 good Performance but low threat of Bankruptcy 
III Above 3.00 Very Viable and Sound Performance with no threat of 
Bankruptcy 
2.4. Some Prior Studies 
Ahmadpour and Shahsavari (2008) examine the link between earnings management 
and the quality of earnings using bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms listed in the 
Tehran Stock Exchange for the period 2007 to 2012. Four separate accounting-based 
earnings attributes were used in operationalizing Earnings quality. Also, the future 
profitability of firms was measured using future change of earnings, future cash flow 
from operations as well as future non-discretionary earnings. The analyses involve 
the use of an estimating unbalanced panel data technique for the 198 non-bankrupt 
firms and the 55 bankrupt firms using Altman's model. It was found that the bankrupt 
firms are inclined to opportunistic earnings management than the non-bankrupt who 
choose efficient earnings management. However, they find earnings management 
having a better predictive power for future profitability than earnings quality.  
Amoa-Gyarteng (2014) investigating Anglogold ashanti, a firm listed in Ghana 
identifies some early indicators signaling bankruptcy and the manipulation of 
financial statement. He relied on the Modified Altman model and the Beneish model 
in analyzing the financial statements of the company for the years 2010 to 2012. The 
Beneish model was used to measure the possibility of financial statement fraud, 
while the modified Altman model was used as a predictor of bankruptcy. Relying on 
the Beneish model, it was discovered that the company was not engaged in financial 
statement fraud during the period under focus. The study could not be established 
bankruptcy threat and evidences reveal that the probability of earnings manipulation 
in the firm was low Bassiouny, Soliman, and Ragab, (2016) assess the impact of firm 
characteristics on earnings management in Egypt listed firms using fifty of the very 
active firms in the Egyptian stock exchange. The analysis is done using the financial 
statements from the disclosure book for the period 2007-2011. A random effect 
generalized least square regression model within the framework of STATA was 
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adopted. They found a significant positive relationship between firms’ financial 
leverage and earnings management while other variables of the firm characteristics 
which are firm size, firm age and firms' audit quality have an insignificant 
relationship with earnings management. 
Hassanpour and Ardakani (2017) investigate pre-bankruptcy financial distress as a 
determinant of the choice of earnings management tools using a sample of 133 listed 
companies in Tehran stock exchange for the period 2010-2014. The independent 
variable, pre-bankruptcy was measured in line with the criteria of Staw et al. (1983) 
and considered the dependent variable, earnings management tools which consist of 
real activity manipulation and accrual manipulation. Research hypotheses were 
tested using the independent t-test within the framework of the econometric 
software, E-views 9.0. Their results reveal a significant positive relationship, 
existing between pre-bankruptcy financial distress and earnings management tool. 
Franceschetti and Koschtial (Undated) sought to investigate the relationship 
discovered by Deloitte and to empirically verify Deloitte’s stated thesis that 
companies facing a potential insolvency are likely to act fraudulently three times 
more than highly solvent firms. The inability of their results to confirm the assertion, 
led to the rejection of Deloitte’s thesis. While attempting to fill the gap with an 
empirical evidence on the relationship between insolvency and fraud, the study 
adopts the Beneish’s approach on a sample of 30 bankrupt and 30 non-bankrupt 
Small and Medium-sized enterprises. Their results are at tandem with prior 
researches supporting income decreasing earnings behavior of firms approaching 
bankruptcy. 
Campa et al. (2014) carried out an investigation of the effect financial hardship prior 
to bankruptcy has on earnings manipulation platforms in small and medium 
enterprises. They sought to ascertain the extent to which the stress of financial 
hardship determines whether a firm uses real activity or accruals in earnings 
manipulation. The outcome of their analyses shows that a manager under pressure in 
terms of bankruptcy threat, prepare earnings management using real benefit activities 
rather than accrual. 
Kangarzadehlouei (2009) focusing on the Tehran stock exchange, looks at the link 
between income smoothing and financial distress. The study covers a sample of 81 
member firms listed in the Tehran stock exchange for a 10-year period covering 1997 
to 2006. Adopting the Altman model as a tool to predicting the likelihood of financial 
distress, his result indicates that managers get involve in income smoothing to 
beautify their company’s financial performance and position, without regard to their 
stages of financial distress so as to maximize the firm’s position in the capital market, 
using available tools at their control.  
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3. Methodology 
To examine the causal-effect relationship between the dependent variable and 
independent variables and to test the formulated hypotheses, three binary regression 
estimates were conducted; logit, probit and gompit. This is in addition to descriptive 
statistics and correlation analyses carried out. An expost-facto research design within 
a panel framework is adopted in the study. Though the population of the study 
includes all listed deposit money banks in Nigeria, the study is based on 14 Deposit 
Money Banks quoted on the floor of Nigerian Stock Exchange for the period 2011-
2015. 
Model Specification 
The study modifies Mohsen and Zadollah (2015) model which states that: 
AAit = β0+β1 OCit+β2 BSitt +β3 CEOit +έt      (1) 
Where: 
AAit: Earnings Management (Discretionary accruals) (the  
dependent variable)  
OCit: Institutional ownership i at time t (independent variable)  
BSit: Percent share ownership in the Company i t (independent variable)  
CEOit: Percent of the members’ corporate executives outside i in period t 
(independent variable) 
The study therefore modifies the model as follows: 
M-SCOREit = β0+ β1 Z-score it + β2 FMSit + β3 FMAit + β4 FPERFit+ έt  (2) 
Where: 
M-SCORE: Beneish M-Score, a proxy for earnings management (Dependent 
variable)  
Z-score: Threat of bankruptcy (Independent variable) 
FMS: Firm size (Control variable) 
FMA: Firm age (Control variable) 
FMPERF: Firm performance (Control variable) 
Measurement of Variables 
Earnings management as the dependent variable is measured using the Beneish M-
Score. If M-Score is less than -2.22, the company is unlikely (low probability for 
earnings manipulation) to be a manipulator (represented by 0). If M-Score is greater 
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than -2.22, the company is likely (high probability for earnings manipulation) to be 
a manipulator. (represented by 1) (Beneish, 1999) 
Threat of Bankruptcy is measured by the Z-score. The higher the Z score, the lesser 
the threat of bankruptcy and the lower the Z score, the higher the threat of bankruptcy 
Firm size is measured by the Log of Total Assets; 
Firm age is measured by the Number of listing years;  
Firm performance is measured by the Annual stock price returns. 
 
4. Presentation and Analyses of Result 
In this section, we present the data collected, analyse and interpret them. 
Consequently, it involves the use of both mathematical and statistical methods to 
provide the basis for accepting or rejecting the research hypotheses raised at the 
beginning of the study. It therefore provide the basis for our recommendations and 
conclusions which are responses to the findings made. Models specified in the 
previous chapter are examined empirically. It involves conducting the preliminary 
analysis of the data comprising of descriptive and correlation analysis and thereafter, 
the regression analysis is conducted.  
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 EMSCORE ZSCORE FMS FMA ASRT 
Mean  0.460317  0.466508  3.813968  22.95238  1.043175 
S.D  0.502426  0.201111  0.315286  15.27958  52.97322 
Max  1.000000  1.350000  4.420000  47.00000  152.3800 
Min  0.000000 -0.050000  3.140000  7.000000 -72.11000 
Jarque-Bera  10.50169  88.65772  1.441275  8.448587  10.64000 
JB-State Prob  0.005243  0.000000  0.486442  0.014636  0.004893 
Observations 63 63 63 63 63 
EMSCORE= Earnings Management Score; ZSCORE= Altman Z Score; FMS= Firm size; FMA= Firm 
Age; ASRT= Firm performance measured by annual stock price [. 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables. As observed, earnings 
management score has the following statistics Mean= 0.460 which indicates that the 
average earnings management score is about 0.460. STD= 0.502, with maximum and 
minimum values of 1 and 0 respectively. ZSCORE; Mean= 0.467, STD= 0.201, with 
maximum and minimum values of 1.35 and -0.050 respectively. FMS shows the 
following statistics; Mean= 3.813, STD= 0.315, with maximum and minimum values 
of 4.42 and 3.14 respectively. FMA ; Mean= 22.952, STD = 15.280, with maximum 
and minimum values of 47.00 and 7.00 respectively. Finally, ASRT; Mean= 1.043, 
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STD= 52.973, with maximum and minimum values of 152.38 and -72.11 
respectively. 
Table 3. Pearson Correlation Result 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary; Sample: 165    
Included observations: 63;      
Correlation      
t-Statistic     
EMSCORE  EMSCORE  ZSCORE  FMS  FMA  ASRT  
 1.000000     
 -----      
ZSCORE       
 0.191752 1.000000    
 1.525950 -----     
FMS       
 0.080939 0.280361 1.000000   
 0.634232 2.281179 -----    
FMA       
 -0.282834 -0.001682 0.221648 1.000000  
 -2.303037 -0.013138 1.775282 -----   
ASRT       
 0.179675 0.129313 -0.019076 0.041784 1.000000 
 1.426518 1.018516 -0.149015 0.326629 -----  
From table 3 above, the correlation coefficients of the variables are examined. 
However of particular interest to the study are the correlation between; earnings 
management score and the explanatory variables. Earnings Management Score is 
positively correlated with ZSCORE [r=0.192], FMS [r=0.081] and ASRT [r= 0.180] 
while negatively correlated with FMA [r= -0.282]. 
Binary regression 
To examine the causal-effect relationship between the dependent variable and 
independent variables and to test the formulated hypotheses, the binary regression 
analysis is used since correlation cannot reveal how the independent variables affect 
the probability of firms engage in earnings management. Three binary regression 
estimates are conducted; logit, probit and gompit and the results are presented in the 
table below;  
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Table 4. Binary regression results 
  Model 1 
(Binary Logit) 
 
 
Model 2 
(Binary Probit) 
Model 3 
(Binary Gompit) 
C  -3.581 
{-0.973} 
(0.331) 
 
 
-2.219 
{-0.997} 
( 0.319) 
-2.564 
{-1.016} 
(0.310) 
 
ZSCORE  1.597 
 {1.051} 
 (0.293) 
 
 
0.945 
{1.090} 
(0.276) 
1.576 
{1.280} 
 (0.201) 
 
FMS  0.980 
{0.966} 
 (0.334) 
 
 
0.612 
{0.100} 
(0.320) 
0.735 
{1.082} 
(0.280) 
 
FMA  -0.049 
{-2.417} 
(0.016)* 
 
 
-0.030 
{-2.534} 
(0.011)* 
-0.031 
{-2.484} 
(0.013)* 
 
ASRT  0.008 
{1.490} 
(0.136) 
 
 
0.005 
{1.504} 
(0.132) 
0.006 
{1.503} 
 (0.133) 
 
McFadden R-
Squared 
LR Statistics  
Log Likelihood (LL) 
Probability 
distribution 
N 
Obs with Dep = 0 
Obs with Dep = 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.123 
10.733(0.030)* 
-38.103 
Logistic 
63 
34 
29 
 
 0.124 
10.821(0.029)* 
-38.059 
Normal 
63 
34 
29 
0.132 
11.462(0.022)* 
-139.110 
Gev 
63 
34 
29 
 
Note: (1) Parentheses { } are Z-statistic; (2)Parentheses ( ) are P-values; (3) *5% level of 
significance  
The study adopts the three widely used models of binary regression which are the 
Logit, Probit and Gompit models. The distinguishable quality of these models is the 
type of probability distribution they assume. For the Logistic binary regression 
model, a cumulative logistic probability distribution is assumed. The binary Probit 
model has a cumulative normal distribution property while the Gompit binary 
regression follows a generalized extreme value distribution. Unlike the probit and 
logit regressions which apply a symmetric link function so that the response curve 
approaches zero as the same rate it approaches one, the Gompit regression on the 
other hand uses an asymmetric link function given by the quantile function of the 
Generalize Extreme Value (GEV) random variable. (Calabrese & Osmetti, 2013) In 
Table 4.4, we observed that all three estimations; (logit, probit and Gompit) models 
did not show very impressive results. From the McFadden R-squared value, the 
results shows that for the logit estimation, the model explains about 12.3%, using the 
probit estimation the model explains that about 12.4% and using the Gompit 
estimation, the model explains 13.2% of the outcome of the dependent variable.  
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The LR statistic for all three models revealed that they were all statistically 
significant and valid in explaining the outcome of the dependent variable 
[logit=0.030<0.05; probit= 0.029<0.05; gompit= 0.022<0.05]. Looking at the 
marginal effects of the study’s independent variables, it is seen that the ZSCORE has 
a positive and insignificant impact (logit result, β1=1.597, p=0.293; probit result, 
β1=0.945, p=0.276; Gompit result= β1=1.576, p=0.201) on the likely extent of banks 
engaging in earnings management practices. Firm Size (FMS) impacts positively but 
insignificantly (logit result, β2= 0.980, p=0.334; probit result, β2= 0.612, p=0.320; 
Gompit result = β2= 0.735, p=0.280) on the on the likely extent of banks engaging 
in earnings management practices. Firm age (FMA) has a negative but significant 
impact (logit result, β3=-0.049, p=0.016; probit result, β3=-0.030, p=0.011; Gompit 
result, β3= -0.031, p=0.013) on the likely extent of banks engaging in earnings 
management practices in Nigeria. It is also evident that firm financial performance 
as measured by annual stock price (ASRT) has a positive but not statistically 
significant impact (logit result, β4=0.008, p=0.136; probit result, β4=0.005, p=0.132; 
Gompit result, β4= 0.006, p=0.133) on the likely extent of banks engaging in earnings 
practices in Nigeria.  
Hypotheses Testing and Discussion of Findings 
Ho1:  Bankruptcy threat has no significant impact on the likelihood of an upward 
earnings manipulation in Nigerian listed banks 
The null hypothesis that bankruptcy threat has no significant impact on the likelihood 
of an upward earnings manipulation in Nigeria listed banks is not rejected. This is 
because the significant statistic value (p=0.201) is less than 0.5. Thus implies that 
earnings management practices seem not to be induced by bankruptcy threat. This 
seems to be in tandem with the result of Franceschetti and Koschtial (undated); 
Amoa-Gyarteng (2014), notes the existence of no empirical evidence on the assertion 
that the threat of bankruptcy is a significant motivation for an upward manipulation 
of earnings. Our finding negates the result of Kangarzadehlouei, (2009). Among all 
the explanatory variables in the study, only firm age has a significant but negative 
impact on upward earnings manipulation. Other explanatory variables in the model 
though positive, has an insignificant impact on upward earnings management.  
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
The study investigates the causal relationship between the threat of bankruptcy and 
the likelihood of earnings manipulation in Nigerian listed Banks for the period 2011-
2015, using the Altman Z-score and the Beneish M-score models. Adopting an 
expost-facto research design within a panel framework, the study uses binary 
regression models in testing the hypothesis. Data were analyzed using Eview 8.0 and 
the result reveals that bankruptcy threat has no significant impact on the likelihood 
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of an upward earnings manipulation in Nigeria listed banks. We advocate that less 
emphasis be placed by regulators on the bankruptcy position of banks when probing 
into issues of earnings manipulation as banks manipulate their earnings not 
necessarily because of the threat of bankruptcy, but submit that non-potentially 
bankrupt firms involve in upward earnings manipulation as well. We also 
recommend that further studies be carried out to investigate the threat of bankruptcy 
and earnings manipulation using proxies other that the Altman Z-score and the 
Beneish M-score. Our study should be viewed in the light of its limitations. First the 
study adopts probability measures of bankruptcy threat and earnings management; 
second, our study did not consider a downward manipulation of earnings which 
could result from bankruptcy threat. Our study is likely the first using Nigerian data 
in examining the threat of bankruptcy and earnings manipulation nexus. Our study 
has both regulatory and policy implications. 
The implication of our findings is that the manipulation of earnings in Nigerian banks 
is spurred significantly by other factors outside the threat of bankruptcy. By this, 
regulators are to place less emphasis on the bankruptcy position of banks when 
probing into issues of earnings manipulation. Banks manipulate their earnings not 
just because of the threat of bankruptcy as non-potentially bankrupt firms are also 
associated with upward earnings manipulation. The manipulation of earnings may 
make a firm escape bankruptcy and regulatory sanction, but not for long, as the true 
position of the firm will definitely be revealed. This is in line with the well-known 
case of Enron. This implies that earnings manipulation in potentially bankrupt firms 
is discovered sooner than later. Therefore, bankruptcy threat may bring about not 
just an upward earnings manipulation, but also a downward earnings manipulation, 
so as to attract the sympathy of creditors. What then are the significant motivations 
for an upward earnings manipulation? This provides a gap to be filled by further 
research. Further studies should investigate the likelihood of Bankruptcy and 
Earnings manipulation using proxies other than those used in this study, which are 
highly probable. Also, other sectors of the Nigerian economy other that listed banks 
should be examined. Also, the threat of bankruptcy on a downward earnings 
manipulation should be considered, alongside the motivation for an upward earnings 
manipulation. 
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